Although the first gunshots of the Nigerian Civil War were fired in Gakem, Ogoja Province (now Cross River State) on July 6 1967, the roots of the conflict lay much deeper in the shoddy political arrangements and characters that preceded and surrounded the British handover at Independence in 1960. Here is a brief, breezy and fascinating summary of events from 1960 by VICTOR ANAZONWU, taken from his book, What Everyone Should Know About Nigerian History, Politics & Government (published in 2016). It’s for your reading pleasure and sober reflection.
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO COLLAPSE OF CIVIL RULE (1960 – 1967)
Highway to Anarchy
As the British flag (the union jack) was lowered and the green-white-green flag of newly independent Nigeria hoisted in its place on October 1, 1960, joy and optimism over-shadowed all other emotions. The people celebrated the end of colonialism and looked forward to the rise of an African power-house firmly in charge of its own destiny. The hope was that with Independence secured and governance in the hands of its own people, Nigeria would quickly overcome its numerous problems of nationhood, especially the divisive tendencies of its leaders and regions, evident from its anti-colonial struggle. Many also dreamed that it would emerge as a bastion of liberty and a pride to Black people.
But it did not take long before reality set in. The country’s shoddy socio-political arrangements and weak inter-group foundations came back to haunt her. The first major sign of trouble occurred in May, 1962. It took the form of an open disagreement within the opposition AG between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, party and opposition leader in the Federal Parliament, and Chief Samuel Akintola, then deputy party leader and Premier of Western Nigeria.
Initial dispute centered on the fate and direction of the party. Awolowo wanted to transform the Action Group from a Western Regional party into a National movement with a radical socialist outlook and appeal to the youth. The goal was to build on its role as opposition party to create a more formidable platform capable of defeating the NPC and NCNC in subsequent elections. Akintola advocated that the Action Group should enter the Federal Coalition Government to stop the Yoruba from losing juicy appointments to rival ethnic groups. He argued that the Action Group should face reality and stay in the West. It was a battle between the purists and the pragmatists. This ideological difference spiraled into a personal conflict and struggle for power leading to the break-up of the AG into two factions. S.L. Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) emerged as splinter group.
Political crisis and violence erupted in the region-al parliament and on the streets of Western Nigeria. Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, declared a state of emergency in the Western Region. Dr. M.A. Majekodunmi was appointed Administrator. In 1963, at the expiration of the state of emergency, Akintola returned as Premier. In the elections of 1965, he won as candidate of NNDP which had entered into alliance with the ruling NPC!
All through the crisis, the AG cried foul, claiming the NPC was undermining it to gain control of the west. The NPC pleaded innocent, saying the AG imploded owing to internal ideological differences. The state of emergency was similarly seen in different lights. While the AG said it was designed to stop the party from properly removing the “mole” in its midst (Akintola) as premier and assuming rightful control of its western stronghold, the NPC claimed it was inevitable to halt further slide to anarchy. These series of events earned for the Western region the derisive appellation of “Wild, Wild, West.”
At about the same time, the Census crisis of 1962 broke out. The exercise which commenced on May 13, 1962 was cancelled owing to allegations of widespread irregularity. Another attempt in 1963 was similarly discredited but officially accepted. With a total head-count of 55.6 million, each region and party accused the other of manipulating the exercise and cooking numbers for political advantage. Whilst opposition and census crisis simmered, Prime Minister Balewa decided in 1963 to carve out Mid-West Region from Western Region. Even though this was done under the pretext of agitation for self determination and under the aegis of an all-party conference, it appeared hypocritical and intended to further weaken the opposition’s political base as similar agitations in the North and East were blissfully ignored.
For instance, the peoples of the Middle Belt wanted out of the North while the peoples of Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers areas wanted out of the East. Yet none of these were granted regional status in 1964 alongside the Mid-West. To make matters worse, leading members of the opposition AG were arrested and put on trial over allegations of plotting to “forcefully overthrow the legitimate government in Nigeria.”
If nothing else, the Federal Government under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and the NPC/NCNC alliance appeared guilty of administrative insensitivity and political naivety.
As political tension simmered, the lifestyle of politicians and public office holders grew more flamboyant. Festus Okotie-Eboh, who headed the Finance ministry, was particularly notorious for flashy and ostentatious displays. Suspicion and allegations of corruption became rife. Although rumors of impending military coup cropped up now and again, the politicians obviously did not take them too seriously.
Military Intervention in Politics
It was under such heavy clouds of political instability and moral disquiet that a group of young army officers struck on Saturday, January 15, 1966 in what became Nigeria’s first military coup d’état. Led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, other key conspirators included Majors Timothy Onwuatuegwu, EmmanuelIfeajuna, Adewale Ademoyega and Chris Anuforo. They were later called the Five Majors.
Disgruntled by the incompetence of the politicians, the young officers had ambitions of righting the wrongs of the time and putting the country back on track. According to Nzeogwu’s noon speech made on Radio Kaduna, “The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife.“
But like the people they sought to replace, the coupists lacked experience and political wisdom to implement their dreams. With the exception of Adewale Ademoyega, for instance, the rest of the coup leaders were officers of Igbo extraction. In a country where ethnic distrust was norm and the fear of “Igbo domination” had been part of the political lexicon since 1946, thiswas a major planning blunder. Team composition was unbalanced. To make matters worse, the emerging list of casualties, 11 senior politicians and 2 soldiers, contained no Igbo names! The Igbo members of the Balewa government were either safely out of the country (like Azikiwe), or miraculously unharmed in the putsch!! Other ethnic groups cried foul.
This was not just an implementation blunder; it turned out to be the major undoing of the coup. People, particularly from other ethnic groups, quickly concluded that the coup was a plot by Igbos to forcefully take over the country–something they could not do via the ballot box. This conspiracy theory gained ground. The 5 Majors had toppled a corrupt and inept government but lost the hearts of the people.
With little real control over combatant troops and the armory, the coup promptly failed. Its perpetrators either fled or were arrested. Remnants of the civilian government led by Senate President, Nwafor Orizu (who was Acting President in the absence of Azikiwe), announced a “voluntary” handover of power to the most senior Nigerian military officer, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. Another account has it that Ironsi “at Gun point forced the remaining members of Balewa’s Government to resign. He then made the Senate President Nwafor Orizu, who was serving as Acting President in Azikiwe’s absence, to officially surrender power to him, staging a coup of his own and ending the First Nigerian Republic.”
Whatever the true account was, it turned out that the most senior military officer, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, was himself also Igbo. So, Ironsi took over government under heavy clouds of suspicion about his ethnicity, role in the coup and intentions. Simply put, the general was not trusted –neither within the army (his immediate constituency) nor among the people. With this dramatic turn of events, the political flash point suddenly shifted from Western to Eastern Nigeria; from wild-wild-west to a deeply distrusted east. Disturbances in the west suddenly took a back seat as both North and West closed ranks at the prospect of a “conspiratorial” East. Over the next 6-7 months, Ironsi tried to stabilize the country through a series of administrative measures aimed at taking away power from the riotous regions and concentrating same in the hands of a more disciplined central government. This was encapsulated in his famous Decree No. 34.
It turned out to be an error of judgment. Subsequent events showed that the regions resented the idea of taking instructions for everyday business from a central government, especially one led by a man whose real loyalty or sympathy was in doubt. Ironsi also tried to court aggrieved ethnic groups through political appointments and patronage. But his failure to punish thecoup plotters heightened suspicions about his complicity.
On July 29, 1966, 194 days after he became head of state, Ironsi was abducted from Government House, Ibadan. He was on a nationwide tour. His abductors were soldiers led by Theophilus Danjuma. His body and that of his host governor, Lt-Col Adekunle Fajuyi, were later found in a nearby forest. It was Nigeria’s second coup, a counter coup led by officers of Northern extraction, who bought into the earlier Igbo conspiracy theory.
The original goal of the counter-coup led by Muritala Mohammed was to take the North out of Nigeria. “Araba”, a word meaning “to separate”, was not only the dominant slogan in the north at the time but also the code name for the July 1966 counter-coup. But through the combined effort of intellectuals, civil servants and emissaries of foreign governments, the secession element of the agenda was dropped. The coup leaders were persuaded that the overall best interests of the North were well served within a single country.
Civil War Reflections (56th Anniversary) will be published in The Renaissance Online Magazine from May 30 to June 30, 2023.
