A recent article by Maximilian Ugoji revisits an increasingly fashionable argument in Nigeria’s political discourse: that the Southeast has allegedly isolated itself from federal power through “emotional outrage,” and therefore cannot expect meaningful federal attention or development.
According to this line of reasoning, other regions of Nigeria have advanced because they mastered the art of political alignment, elite negotiation, and strategic cooperation with central authority. The Southeast, we are told, has failed in this regard.
The implication is unmistakable: if the region desires inclusion, projects, and political relevance, it must abandon its current political dispositions (notably its massive support for Peter Obi and the Obidient Movement), switch allegiance to APC, and embrace the ruling establishment under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Simple!
At first glance, the argument appears reasonable enough. It is polished in tone, couched in the language of pragmatism, and marketed as constructive advice. But beneath the grammar lies a deeply flawed diagnosis — and perhaps an even more troubling political intention.
The first problem is the assumption that the Southeast is politically monolithic in its relationship with the current administration. That claim simply does not survive scrutiny.
Most governors in the Southeast today are either members of the APC, aligned with it, or maintain cordial relationships with the federal government. A few prominent figures from the region occupy influential positions within the administration or openly identify as allies of President Bola Tinubu.
Works Minister and Former Ebonyi State Governor, Dave Umahi, is the poster boy of this group. Imo State Governor, and until recently the undisputed Chairman of APC Governors Forum, Hope Uzodimma, is another stalwart of the ruling party. Anambra State Governor, Prof C. C. Soludo, never ceases to remind us that “Tinubu is my friend.” And Governor Peter Mbah of Enugu State recently defected from the PDP to APC – along with his entire household, friends, associates, cronies and political structures.
If political “alignment” is truly the currency of development, then by now the Southeast should qualify as one of the federation’s most “strategically positioned” regions. And a major beneficiary of federal projects and development assistance.
Yet the narrative of “Igbo hostility” persists.
One is therefore compelled to ask: What do the likes of Maximilian Ugoji actually mean by Igbo “alignment” with Abuja or national politics? What REALLY is the Southeast expected to do? Why this carefully cultivated political narrative — one that seeks not merely to interpret the Southeast, but to psychologically discipline it.
That distinction matters.
Because beneath the recurring lectures about gratitude and alignment lies an unmistakable anxiety about the enduring popularity of Peter Obi in the Southeast and increasingly across Nigeria. What unsettles many within the ruling establishment is not simply electoral opposition; it is the persistence of political conviction in spite of pressure, inducement, and sustained propaganda.
The 2023 presidential election fundamentally altered Nigeria’s political conversation. It demonstrated that millions of Nigerians, especially younger voters, were willing to rally around a candidate associated with prudence, competence, accountability, and restraint. The Southeast became the symbolic epicenter of that movement, not merely because Peter Obi is Igbo and native to the area, but because many in the region saw in him a reflection of values they considered essential for national renewal.
Three years later, that sentiment has hardly dissipated. It is probably stronger.
Indeed, the economic and social realities confronting Nigerians today have not only reinforced the sentiment, it has intensified public frustration across the country. Inflation remains punishing. Living standards continue to decline. Businesses struggle. Insecurity persists. Even institutions and commentators once sympathetic to the administration’s reform agenda now acknowledge the terrible hardship facing ordinary Nigerians.
This is why it is intellectually dishonest to reduce dissatisfaction with the Tinubu administration to an “Igbo problem” or Southeast “emotional outrage.” Nigerians from every corner and region are openly expressing disillusionment. The Southeast is merely being singled out because it was among the earliest and most vocal constituencies to reject the political direction represented by the APC.
In retrospect, many now privately admit that the region’s concerns, expressed by voting patterns during the 2023 election, were not entirely misplaced. Some even go as far as saying that Tinubu’s glaring failures vindicate the Southeast’s political instincts.
That reality does not necessarily prove Peter Obi would have solved all of Nigeria’s problems. No serious observer should make such simplistic claims. But it does validate the point of those who believed in 2023 that Nigeria required a different leadership culture — one less associated with patronage politics, elite bargaining, and the transactional habits that have long defined the Nigerian state.
This is where the argument about “political negotiation” becomes particularly revealing.
There is nothing inherently wrong with regions advocating for themselves within a federal system. Every democracy involves negotiation, coalition-building, and strategic engagement. However, when access to basic infrastructure, inclusion, or development becomes contingent upon political surrender or emotional compliance, then citizenship itself becomes dangerously conditional.
The Southeast is not asking for special favors. It is asking for fairness – for all.
There is a profound difference between demanding privilege and demanding equity.
The exclusion of the Southeast from key national infrastructure initiatives (like the new national rail network) under previous administrations was not controversial because the region expected preferential treatment. It was controversial because citizens of a federation reasonably expect equal consideration within the national project – irrespective of voting patterns.
To now frame the proposed correction of such imbalance as an act of presidential charity requiring political gratitude and genuflection misses the point entirely. Meanwhile, it is already in the public domain that nearly $3 billion has already been earmarked for the same rail project in other regions. So, is the Southeast expected to be grateful in advance for what has not yet materialized? Or simply for being re-included in the conversation?
It would be surprising if such a claim came from a historically informed observer of Igbo political culture. Igbos don’t grovel and beg. They don’t think with their stomachs either. They think with both their heads and hearts. They are suckers for merit and performance. APC administrations since 2015 have not measured up in those respects.
The claim that other regions have prospered because of superior political alignment is itself questionable. By several social and developmental indicators, the Southeast remains one of the most socio-economically advanced and resilient regions in Nigeria despite a devastating civil war and limited federal presence since 1970.
Much of that progress emerged not from dependence on Lagos or Abuja, but from private enterprise, communal networks, self-help traditions, and a culture that prizes education, hard work, and individual initiative.
That history matters.
It explains why many Igbo voters often respond less to patronage politics and more to perceived competence and credibility. It also explains why the region has repeatedly supported candidates outside its ethnic fold when persuaded they represented broader, progressive national interest.
The historical record is instructive. The Southeast voted massively for Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 despite the presence of Igbo alternatives. It supported Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007 even with prominent sons of the region contesting. It backed Goodluck Jonathan strongly in 2011 not because of ethnic proximity, but because many considered him a stabilizing national figure at the time, and the rightful successor of Yar’Adua.
The suggestion therefore that the Southeast’s support for Peter Obi is merely ethnic sentiment is both historically inaccurate and politically lazy. It completely misses the essence of Igbo political behavior rooted in character and uncompromising merit.
What exists instead is a particular political temperament — one shaped by republican traditions, skepticism toward centralized authority, and a willingness to endure political punishment rather than abandon deeply held convictions. Whether one agrees with that disposition or not, it deserves serious engagement rather than gaslighting.
It is rooted in a long-standing political culture, and unlikely to be fazed by passing fancy or propaganda.
APC, PDP, ADC and NDC will come and go. The Igbo and their belief system will still be here a thousand years from now.
Ultimately, the deeper question before Nigeria is larger than party politics or electoral strategy.
Should citizens support governments purely for access to federal patronage, regardless of performance? Should political loyalty override economic realities and governance outcomes? Should regions abandon independent judgment in exchange for promises of inclusion?
These are questions every Nigerian region must answer honestly.
The Southeast has answered in its own way. It has chosen, rightly or wrongly, to align itself with a candidate widely seen to embody a different governance ethos — one rooted in competence, restraint, and accountability.
The people of the region believe that a functional Nigerian state benefits all regions equally, including theirs, without the need for political submission.
That conviction may irritate political strategists today. But it is neither accidental nor irrational. It is a coherent political philosophy. And it is not likely to fade any time soon.
